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iv.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
George Allen Kapelle ("Kapelle") appeals from the August 7, 2012 Memorandum
Opinion and Order re: Defendant's Motion to Suppress entered by the Honorable Benjamin R.
Simpson.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In the late afternoon of July 13, 2011, Kapelle was inside his trailer engaged in an on-line
audio/video chat room "virtual party" with his girlfriend, Jennifer, and many others. Some were
playing music which Kapelle amplified through his stereo speakers. Kapelle lived alone in a
remote area of Bonner County, Idaho in his trailer on approximately 10 acres. According to
Kapelle and neighbors, the property had been posted with no trespassing signs for several years.
The property was heavily forested. A former driveway was gated for privacy and traffic
redirected to a side road, Ridge Way, which was not maintained and not open in the winter.
While in his trailer, Kapelle saw a person who appeared to be in plain clothes with gun
drawn in the ready position walking through his backyard meadow. He opened his front door
and saw a second person, gun drawn and pointing at him from about 12 feet away. These were
detectives Ryan and Strangio, who were looking for a wanted felon, Steven Gervasi. There
unmarked police vehicle was parked at the driveway entrance, about five feet from a no
trespassing sign, blocking the driveway. The officers denied seeing the signs and Ryan stated if
he had, he would not have entered. Neighbors testified that in the past Ryan had entered their
property, which was also posted with no trespassing signs, requesting to search for marijuana,
leaving his detectives card which the neighbors produced when testifying. Tr. p. 114-134; 140167; Exh. B, F, G, H, I, J, Kand L.
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The officers testified Gervasi was a dangerous fugitive and, over objection, stated a tip
from a confidential informant indicated he may be in the area living in an abandoned trailer.
Seeing Kapelle, Detective Ryan ran from the meadow to Strangio's location with his gun still
drawn. The officers had to yell, due to the music, asking if a suspect named Gervasi was in the
trailer. Kapelle said no, that Gervasi was not allowed on his property. Ryan stated "you know
we can't leave here until we know if he is inside ... " It was hard to hear and Kapelle, wanting to
tell his girlfriend that he was busy, turned and went into his home to click out of the chat room.
For obvious reasons (a 39 plant marijuana grow room was inside the trailer) Kapelle put up his
hand, indicating he did not want the officers to enter. Both officers followed him inside.
Strangio presented contradictory testimony, first stating Kapelle simply opened the door (Tr. p
93), then stating he was not sure if Kapelle gave verbal consent or just nodded his head, (Tr. p.
103), and later stating he gave verbal consent. (Tr. p. 187). Ryan thought he heard Kapelle say
"OK." Tr. Pgs 11-19, 103-106; 151-167; 185-187; Exh. P.

Upon entering, the officers detected an overwhelming odor of marijuana. Unknown to the
officers, Kapelle's audio contact with his girlfriend was left on, in record mode.

1

Kapelle can

be heard asking the officers to leave immediately after they entered, to which the officers then
stated "it's 5:00 o'clock," "we don't have time for this," "we have nothing to gain off this," "it's
a pain in my ass," "I'm not gonna be here all day arguing," "I'm not going to risk a search
warrant" They repeatedly asked Kapelle if he was "gonna be cool" and consent to a search,
threatening to arrest him if he did not do so. Exhibit P Despite the recording, Ryan denied
stating to Kapelle he was not going to "risk a search warrant". Tr. p. 92.

1 At the trial court's suggestion, at the close of the evidentiary suppression hearing, the parties reviewed the
computer recording and its transcription. By stipulation, the parties agreed to submit Exhibit P, a corrected
transcript of the recording, to the Court as an exhibit. Tr. p. 176; exhibit 2 attached to Kapelle's Motion to
Augment.
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Shortly after this exchange, the officers conducted a recorded interview. At its outset, the
recording discloses:
Ryan: I am not going to arrest you today. As long as we get your full cooperation, I see
no reason why we cannot go ahead and do this to a normal summons.
Kapelle: Can I call an attorney?
Ryan: You know what I am not going to do today, buddy, is that I am not going to waste
more than five minutes bantering this . . . I am in your home man. So I am going
to get this done with, George. So I am not going to have you make a phone call
that is going to threaten my safety or impede my investigation.
Ryan then Mirandized Kapelle and Kapelle admitted marijuana plants were growing in the back
room of his trailer and consented to a warrantless search. Exhibit 21.
Kapelle moved to compel discovery regarding the identity of the tipster and the content
of the tip, which was denied. He then sought suppression, arguing the warrantless entries onto his
property and into his home were illegal. Kapelle further argued that the failure of the officers to
leave his home when requested, and the failure of the officers to honor Kapelle' s request to call
to his attorney prior to being questioned were illegal.
On August 7, 2012 the Honorable Benjamin Simpson denied suppression. On August 27,
2012 the State amended its Information, alleging Manufacturing of a Controlled Substance to
which Kapelle entered a conditional plea of guilty. The Court entered sentence on October 22,
2012. Kapelle appealed the Court's denial of his Motion to Suppress on October 30, 2012,
which appeal was subsequently amended on March 11, 2013.

ARGUMENT

I.
Denial of Kapelle's Motion to Compel Violated Statutory and Constitutional Due Process
and Right of Confrontation.
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Was the tip reliable? How fresh was the information. What was the basis of the
infom1ation? Did the officer's act reasonably in relying on this information? Kapelle sought to
answers to these questions prior to seeking suppression through a Motion to Compel. This
Motion was denied based upon the States assurance that it would not call the tipster as a witness
and the Court's finding, by in camera review, that Kapelle had no right to confront this witness
because the information sought would not be relevant as the officers decision to approach
Kapelle's trailer was simply a mistake R. pp 96-99. Later, the trial court found, afier prohibiting
Kapelle from confronting the source of the information because it was "irrelevant," that the
detectives' warrantless entry was legal because they had a "legitimate" reason to do so.
It is clear the officers were, at a minimum, mistaken in their belief that this was the

abandoned trailer referred to by the informant. At some point, as they approached, the
legitimacy of their entry ceased. Kapelle's Jeep Cherokee, with current registration tags, was
parked in the driveway. A garden was visible, music was playing, a boat, drum set, and other
personal property were visible, and Kapelle explained Gervasi was not allowed on his property.
By not being allowed to confront the tipster or at least discover reliability and what was
disclosed about the trailer, Kapelle's ability to challenge the reasonableness of the officers'
decision to continue and to enter the trailer was compromised. Was it really legitimate to believe,
afier realizing this was Kapelle's home, that Gervasi may be present or did Ryan request entry as
part of his "knock and talk" ventures in this neighborhood. Discovery was highly relevant on this
issue.
Kapelle submits that he was at least entitled to discover the basis for the Court's
concluding that this informer would not be able to provide relevant testimony and/or the basis for
the Court's finding that informant may be subject to "economic, physical or other harm or
coercion" by disclosure of identity. By simply redacting the informant's identity, Kapelle would
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have had the ability to submit, for purposes of appeal, the basis for the Court's findings without
risk to the informant. If there was a reasonable probability that the informer could have provided
testimony on the issue of the legitimacy of the officer's investigation, Kapelle would be entitled
to that relief set forth under Rule 509(3) JR.E. if the State continued to refuse to disclose the
informer's identity. Instead, pursuant to Administrative Rule 32(i), the trial court sealed the
affidavits of Detectives Ryan and Strangio, effectively preventing Kapelle from challenging the
Court's finding. R. p. 101-102.
In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n9., the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
prosecution may not introduce a declarant's out-of-court testimonial statement against a criminal
Defendant unless the declarant is unavailable and the Defendant had a prior opportunity for
cross-examination. However, at the same time, the Court noted an exception to this ruling, citing
its 1985 decision in Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409. The Court stated that the Confrontation
Clause "does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the
truth of the matter asserted".
It is Kapelle's contention that once the State offered information provided by the

informant to the trial court in an attempt to fall within the "legitimate societal purpose"
framework, it was asking the trial court to rely on the same information which it had claimed was
privileged and therefore not subject to disclosure. In asking the trial court to make a critical
finding, that the officers were making a warrantless entry for a legitimate investigation, that
privilege disappeared. The State was required either to abandon its privilege or abandon the
informant's information, it could not benefit from both. If this were the case, every time law
enforcement acted upon a tip, that tip would be admissible to justify police action without
disclosure to the Defendant. This would eviscerate the constitutional right to confront and cross
examine an informant when confronted with warrantless entries. Both before and after
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Crawford, the Federal Courts have opposed such attempts to circumvent the right of
confrontation. United States v. Coplon, 185 F2 nd 629 (2nd Circuit, 1950); US. v. Hearn, 500

F3 rd 479 (6th Circuit, 2007); US. v. Silva, 380 F3 rd 1018 (ih Circuit 2004).
Kapelle contends his ability to pursue suppression has been compromised, a due process
violation. Kapelle is entitled to remand with appropriate instructions to assure due process.

II
WARRANTLESS SEARCH
A
CURTILAGE ENTRY
Substantial and competent evidence does not support the Court's finding that the
detective's lawfully entered the curtilage of Defendant's home.

Warrantless searches are presumed to be umeasonable. Approaching a home by way of it's
driveway requires a warrant as it is within the home's curtilage. Idaho recognizes that no warrant
is required if entry is made for a legitimate societal purpose, but such entries are confined to that
area where an implied invitation to enter exists. It is the state's burden to prove such an exigent
circumstance is present. State v Weaver, 127 Id. 288,290. Kapelle contends this burden has
not been met.
Legitimate Societal Purpose

Entry onto Kapelle's driveway and the ensuing search was based on a tip. Kapelle, who
was aware of Ryan's prior "knock and talk" contacts with neighbors, was skeptical about the tip
and sought to confirm its source and content. R. p. 71-7 3; Argument L supra. The tipster did not
testify. The court allowed, over objection, testimony as to tip content and its reliability "not for
the truth of the matter asserted." Tr. P. 11-14. As such, statements of the tipster cannot be used
6

as substantive proof of a legitimate societal purpose because the court did not accept this
testimony as truthful. The trial court's finding that the officers' presented "sufficient proof that
they were there for a legitimate societal purpose: inquiring into the location of a wanted felon"
(R. p. 166) is not supported by substantial and competent evidence.

Implied Invitation

The trial court found that "the officers stayed on the driveway and path to the front door of
the trailer" and "did not search the area between the entry and the Defendant's trailer. .. " R. p
165. Ryan testified, with gun drawn, he walked into a meadow behind Kapelle's home around

the trailer to its back corner to view the rear window. This area is not within access route to the
trailer entrance. Even if there was an area impliedly open to the public, Ryan was well outside
this area and was within the homes curtilage, where Kapelle had reasonable expection of privacy.
(Tr. p. 58, 64; Exh. B).

The trial court found that the Detectives did not observe the "no trespassing" signs. Given
the testimony of neighbors that Kapelle's signs were in place and that Ryan had a propensity to
ignore their signs while on his "knock and talk" ventures in this neighborhood (Tr. pages 116119; 142-150), the signs were probably in place and visible. The officers' vehicle was parked

within a few feet of one sign. Ryan's denial that he was not aware of the signs is suspect. His
testimony that, when he views such signs, he does not enter the posted property (Tr. p. 75) was
disputed by two neighborhood witnesses, Arthur Rouse and Cheryl Rovang, who testified with
certainty that within the prior two to three years Ryan had entered their property, ignoring no
trespassing signs, which was corroborated by Ryan's business card left with the witnesses. Tr. p.
116-119; 143-150; Exh. E.
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The nature of the Artisan Way neighborhood is significant. Arthur Rouse, retired with a
history in prisoner transport and security, was asked what indicators there were that this
neighborhood liked its' privacy. "Everybody's got signs," "you can't miss them," "roads aren't
maintained because we don't want people up there" was his response. Rouse, a neighbor for 6
years, had never seen a deliveryman approach Kapelle's residence (Tr. 113-126). His testimony
mirrored that of other neighbors and the remote location of these homes. It is difficult to imagine
a less hospitable neighborhood. Clearly, uninvited visitors are neither encouraged nor expected.
No evidence of urgency or hot pursuit was presented. While signs alone do not create a
legitimate expectation of privacy, when combined a primitive road and secluded location, a
respective citizen would not believe he had consent to enter. State v Prewitt, 136 Id. 541; State

v Christianson, 131 Id. 462; State v Jesson, 142 Wn. App. 851 (see also 45 ALR6th 643).

B
HOME ENTRY

Substantial and competent evidence does not support the Court's finding that
Kapelle consented to the detective's entry into his home.
Consent may not come from a head nod, State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94. Consent to
search a home cannot be implied from a shrug of the shoulders during a coercive of atmosphere.

State v. Zapp, 108 Idaho 723. When consent to enter a home is not explicit, the State's burden is
heaviest. State v. Lafferty, 139 Idaho 336. The State cannot presume consent from a lack of
express refusal. State v. Staatz, 132 Idaho 693. In Staatz, where the only evidence presented by
the State that Staatz consented to entry was a "yes" answer to the question of whether the officers
were "let" into her home, the court found this one word answer was insufficient to satisfy the
State's burden that entry was consensual. In State vs. Abeyta, 131 Idaho 704, the State did not
8

meet its burden and the officer's entry into a residence was found to be illegal when the officers
followed Abeyta into his home when he left them at the front door to answer a ringing telephone.
Here, the State did not meet its consent burden. Detective Strangio contradicted himself,
first testifying Kapelle simply opened the door and they entered, and later testifying Kapelle
verbally consented and/or nodded his head. Tr. p. 93, 103, 187. Detective Ryan testified
Kapelle "just said okay and turned and walked into the home leaving the door open." Tr. p. 28.
Loud music was playing and the officers were about 12 feet away from Kapelle as he stood on
his front porch. It is unlikely that Kapelle would consent to officers entering his home when it
contained an overwhelming odor of marijuana and 39 marijuana plants. It is just as likely that
Kapelle reentered his house to tum down the music and tell his girlfriend he was busy.

If Kapelle did consent to entry, the record does not show that consent was voluntary.

Within a matter of seconds, Kapelle transitioned from a virtual on-line party to being
confronted with two plain officers with guns drawn. Unannounced visitors, let alone armed
police officers, would be unexpected along Artisan Way, a remote neighborhood heavily posted
with no trespassing signs. The officer's described Kapelle's demeanor as wide eyed, scared,
nervous and confused. Tr. p. 89. The officer's nervous and excited demeanor further contributed
towards a highly coercive atmosphere. After telling the officers Gervasi was not allowed on his
property, Kapelle was told by Detective Ryan "brother, you know we can't leave until we know
if he is here or not ... " The voluntariness of a consent to search must be determined from the
totality of circumstances. State v. Thorpe, 141 Idaho 151 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412
U.S. 218).
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If Kapelle consented to home entry and it was voluntary, the record shows the consent was

revoked.
The officers' recollection of what occurred immediately after entry is contradicted by a
computer recording. On the computer recording, a voice can be heard stating the words "I would
like you guys to ... (inaudible)," followed by "that is not going to happen". Kapelle testified he
stated "I would like you guys to leave". Ryan agreed that, if Kapelle claimed Ryan was asked to
leave but refused, this was probably true (Tr. p. 71).
Consent to search a home may be revoked. No magic words are required to do so. State
v. Thorpe, 141 Idaho 151. In Staatz, after entry the officers' were asked to "go outside" so Staatz
could "think things out". Applying the objective reasonableness test, the Court stated the
obvious, a reasonable person would understand they were to leave. 132 Id@ 196. Once inside
Kapell's trailer, the smell marijuana did not entitle the officers to stay. Odor does not justify a
warrantless entry into a home if the suspect crime is nonviolent. The distinction is not
misdemeanor vs. felony, it is violence vs. nonviolence. State v Curl, 125 Idaho 224; .State v
Salinas, 134 Id 362.

C
HOME SEARCH
After entry, the record shows Kapelle's consent to search his home was involuntary.
Once inside, not only did the officers refuse Kapelle's request that they leave, when asked
to leave, Ryan can be heard on the computer recording responding: "it's 5:00 o'clock," "we
don't have time for this," "we have nothing to gain off this," "it's a pain in my ass," "I'm not
gonna be here all day arguing," "I'm not going to risk a search warrant" Kapelle repeatedly
asked if he was "gonna be cool" and consent to a search, threatening to arrest him ifhe did not
do so. Exhibit "P ".
10

Shortly after this exchange, the officers conducted a recorded interview. At its outset, the
recording discloses:
Ryan: I am not going to arrest you today. As long as we get your full cooperation, I see
no reason why we cannot go ahead and do this to a normal summons.
Kapelle: Can I call an attorney?
Ryan: You know what I am going to do today, buddy, is I am not going to waste more
than five minutes bantering this. This happened in the past to me before. I tried to be
polite to somebody. And for some odd reason judges seem to think that that might imply
in taking the time to explain things to people overly on these types of environments that
maybe somehow there is a continued detention. I am in your home, man. So I am going
to get this done with, George. So I am not going to have you make any phone call that is
going to threaten my safety or impede my investigation." Exh. 21.
They made it clear to Kapelle that if he did not consent to a full search, they would "lock down"
the premises and that Kapelle would be arrested. Exh. P. Only then did Kapelle consent to a
search of his home.
A consent obtained by coercion through explicit or implicit means is not valid. Whether
a consent is voluntary is determined under the totality of the circumstances. Schneckloth v.

Bustamante, 412 US. 218 (1973). A coercive environment deprives a suspect of his free will.
State vs. Davis, 115 Idaho 462. The request for counsel must be scrupulously honored. "State v
Person, 140 Idaho, 934", While it is one thing for the trial court to find that there's no legal

authority establishing an obligation on the government to allow Kapelle to call an attorney, it is
quite another to suggest than actual denial of such a request has no bearing on the voluntariness
issue. Surely consent is much more likely to be voluntary after a suspect is allowed to consult
with counsel.
Even if the circumstances are such that there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel at
the time a person is asked to consent to a search, it would be highly relevant under the
Schneckloth voluntariness test that the consent was obtained following a police refusal to
grant the person's request to consult with counsel. Cite: LaFave, Search and Seizure,
Fourth Edition, Section 8.2(k) page 121 (citingfootnote 317).
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The State has the burden of demonstrating that Kapelle's consent was voluntarily given
and not the result of coercion, either direct or implied. Voluntariness is evaluated in light of all
circumstances. State v. Abeyta (supra).

III
ATTENUATION DOCTRINE
Kapelle's Consent and Admissions are tainted by the illegal entry and/or failure of
the officers to leave his property when consent was revoked.
After the officers entered Kapelle's home, he admitted he was growing marijuana and
signed a written consent authorizing the search of his trailer. If the officers entry upon his
property, entry into his trailer and/or failure to leave his trailer when requested were illegal, it is
Kapelle's contention that the State has failed to meet its burden to establish that Kapelle's
admissions and written consent to search his trailer were not induced by the officer's preceding
illegality. The attenuation doctrine requires three factors to be considered by the Court.
( 1) The elapsed time between misconduct and acquisition of evidence,
(2) The occurrence of interviewing circumstances; and
(3) The flagrance and purpose of the improper police enforcement action.
State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 846.
Here, only minutes passed between an illegal entry onto Kapelle's property and into his
trailer, and Kapelle's admission that the plants were growing in the back room. Detecting the
odor of marijuana was not an intervening circumstance, but rather the result of the preceding
illegalities. These entries, followed by a denial of right to counsel and a refusal to leave when
requested, were flagrant. The fact that Kapelle capitulated does not mean he did so voluntarily.
As stated in State v. Staatz, "one cannot expect a residence to continue to object after his or her
first request to leave has been rebuked by the authorities. 132 Idaho @ 697.
12

CONCLUSION
All evidence seized from Kapelle's home should be suppressed. All incriminating
statements made by Kapelle should be suppressed. If suppression is denied, the State should be
ordered to comply with Defendant's Motion to Compel and this matter should be remanded for
rehearing on Defendant's Motion to Suppress.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 29th day of August, 2013.

Fred R. Palmer
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

:;6 day of August, 2013, two true and correct copies of
I hereby certify that on the
the foregoing Brief of Appellant were mailed, postage prepaid, by U.S. Mail, addressed to:
Lawrence G. Wasden
Idaho Attorney General
P. 0. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
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